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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELNA A. SHUPE and 
YAVETTE SHUPE, by and 
through her Guardian Ad Li tem, 
ELNA A. SHUPE, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appel lants , 
vs . 
WASATCH ELECTRIC COMPANY, 
INC. , a Utah corporat ion, and 
ESCO CORPORATION, an 
Oregon corporat ion, 
Defendants and 
Respondents . 
Civil No. 223 403* 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a wrongful death action brought by the surviving widow and 
infant child of a deceased workman to recover damages for negligence against 
an e l ec t r i ca l subcontrac tor . 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Dis t r ic t Court of the Third Judicial Dis t r ic t granted Respondent ' s 
mot ion for summary judgment, thereby d ismiss ing Appel lants ' complaint 
on the bas i s that it failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could 
be granted. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON A P P E A L 
Appellants submit that the Order of Summary Judgment should be 
r e v e r s e d and the case remanded for t r i a l on the m e r i t s . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 19, 1974, one Tom Shupe, a ca rpen te r , deceased , was in the 
employ of Chr is t iansen Bro the r s Construction Company, a genera l cont rac tor . 
On this date Shupe was working at a construct ion site known as Canyon Towers 
Condominiums in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Respondent, Wasatch E lec t r i c Company, had contracted with Chr i s t i ansen 
Bro the r s Construction Company to design, furnish, and ins ta l l a l l n e c e s s a r y 
e l ec t r i ca l work for the construct ion s i te . P r i o r to July 19, 1974, respondent , 
as e l ec t r i ca l cont rac tor , had instal led cer ta in cables used to t r a n s mi t e l ec t r i ca l 
power to cer ta in pieces of construct ion equipment, namely a crane owned and 
operated by Esco Corporat ion, another defendant in this action. 
On the date in question, Mr. Shupe, in his employment a s a ca rpen te r 
employed by the genera l con t rac tor , was performing genera l ca rpen t ry work 
at the north end of the construct ion s i te . The cables r e f e r r e d to were supplying 
e l ec t r i ca l energy to the c rane located to the south and wes t at a significant 
dis tance from where the deceased was working. These cables had been negl i -
gently and ca r e l e s s ly placed. The cables c a r r i e d 400 Volts with high amperage 
and were of a type general ly encased in me ta l conduit for protect ion from 
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breaking a thin insulating sheath. The cables were not protected in meta l 
conduit nor any other type of protection at the t ime of the incident in question. 
These cables had been negligently draped over cer ta in meta l forms and 
reinforcing s teel some distance from where the decedent, Tom Shupe, was 
working as a carpenter building the subject fo rms . The e lec t r i c cable had 
not been encased in any protect ive tubing or enclosure and was draped a c r o s s 
the forms and reinforcing s teel upon which the decedent Tom Shupe was working. 
Subsequently, the cables energized cer ta in cement forms which extended from 
the defect in the cables in a nor ther ly direct ion to the point where Shupe was 
located. Mr. Shupe came into contact with said cement forms during the 
no rma l performance of his duties as a genera l ca rpen te r . Mr . Shupe was 
e lect rocuted. 
Mr. Shupe's surviving widow and infant daughter bring this action 
against the e l ec t r i ca l cont rac tor , Wasatch E lec t r i c Company, for the wrongful 
death of Tom Shupe, their husband and father respect ive ly . 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS' 
CAUSE OF ACTION SINCE RESPONDENT WAS NOT ENGAGED 
IN THE SAME EMPLOYMENT AS WAS THE DECEASED WORK-
MAN. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-62 express ly allows an injured employee 
or his he i r s to maintain an action for damages when those damages a r e caused 
by the negligence of a person not in the same employment. 
The Utah Supreme Court considered the meaning of the t e r m , "person 
not in the same employment" in 1972. Pe te r son v. Fowler , 27 Utah 2d 159, 
493 P. 2d 997 (1972). The ent i re Court concur red in holding that the t e r m 
"same employment" as used in Workmen ' s Compensation should be given the 
meaning which had been at tached to it under the fellow servant rule of the 
cases decided p r io r to the inception of Workmen ' s Compensation. The Court 
further explained: 
, f
. . . unless they were engaged in the same employment at the 
same t ime , they were not fellow servants so as to prevent 
an action against their common employer . If they wece 
employed in separa te depar tments of the same e n t e r p r i s e , 
they were not considered fellow servants unless their work 
was so re la ted that they were likely to be in such proximity 
to one another that some special r i s k could be ant icipated to 
one if the other was negligent. " Id at p. 163. 
Accordingly, it is c lear that the Defendant was not engaged in the same 
employment . Although engaged in a common e n t e r p r i s e , Tom Shupe, ca rpen te r 
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for Chr is t iansen Brothers Construction Company, and Wasatch E l ec t r i c a l 
Company, e l ec t r i ca l subcont rac tor , were cer ta inly "employed in different 
depar tments . ,! It is a lso evident that their work was not closely re la ted 
nor were they in close physical proximity. Decedent was engaged in genera l 
carpent ry ; defendant in supplying high voltage e l ec t r i ca l energy. In addition, 
at the t ime of the Shupe's death he was working at a distance of from one 
hundred to one hundred twenty feet from Respondent ' s cables . 
Two impor tant decisions of this Court have d iscussed this same i s sue . 
In Adamson v. Okland Construction Company, 29 Utah 2d 286, 508 P. 2d 805 
(1973), and Smith v. Alfred Brown Company, 29 Utah 2d 1955, 493 P. 2d 994 
(1972), the Court found that the "not in the same employment" r equ i remen t 
was not met and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. 
However, these two cases a r e not controlling of the case at bar . In the case 
at bar , Appel lants ' decedent was an employee of the genera l contractor whose 
he i r s seek to maintain this action against a subcontrac tor , while in the 
Adamson and Smith cases just quoted the suit in each case was by an employe 
of the subcontractor against the genera l cont rac tor . 
In Adams on and Smith, it was held that ajppe Hants as employees of 
subcont rac tors were employees of the genera l contrac tor because of the 
nature and extent of control the genera l cont rac tor had over the respec t ive 
subcont rac to rs . As ar t icu la ted by the Adamson Court: 
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l!In this regard it should be kept in mind that the test to be 
applied is the right to supervise and control, and not neces-
sarily the degree to which that right is in fact exercised." 
Supra at p. 289. 
In Adamson, and Smith, such control was found to exist on the basis 
of Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-45 which states: 
"Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or 
in part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains 
supervision or control, and such work is a part or process 
in the trade or business of the employer, such contractor, 
and all persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under 
him, and all persons employed by any such subcontractor, shall 
be deemed, within the meaning of this section, employees of 
such employer. M 
This provision, however, does not characterize.*the relationship 
between the general and subcontractor in the case at bar. As set forth in the 
written contract between Christiansen and Wasatch Electrical Company, 
Christiansen Brothers (the general contractor) had no general right of contro 
and supervision^. According to clause three of the contract, the general con-
tractor retained the privilege of intervening only in the event that Wasatch 
failed to provide the labor and materials called for. This clause states: 
, f
. . . in the event that the Subcontractor neglects and/or fails 
to supply the necessary labor and/or materials, tools, imple-
ments, equipment, etc. , in the opinion of the Contractor, then 
the Contractor shall notify the Subcontractor in writing setting 
forth the deficiency and/or delinquency, and five days after 
date of such written notice, the Contractor shall have the right 
if he so desires to take over the work of the Subcontractor. . . n . 
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Clear ly , the r ight to intervene in the event the subcontractor failed to pe r fo rm 
is not tantamount to a genera l r ight to superv i se , d i rec t and control the sub-
contrac tor during the course of his pe r formance . 
In addition, according to clause one of the wr i t ten contract , Wasatch 
E l ec t r i c a l did not m e r e l y agree to supply labor and m a t e r i a l s in accord with 
the genera l con t r ac to r ' s design. On the con t ra ry , the contract explicitly 
s ta tes that Wasatch E l e c t r i c a l was obligated to design al l e l ec t r i ca l work for 
construct ion on the job s i te . Clause one s ta tes : 
"That the work to be per formed by the Subcontractor under 
the t e r m s of this ag reement consis t of the following: furnish-
ing of al l labor and m a t e r i a l s , tools , implement s , and equip-
ment , scaffolding, p e r m i t s , fees , e tc . , to do al l of the following: 
Design, furnish and ins ta l l a l l e l ec t r i ca l work. . . '• 
The fact that respondent was responsib le for the design itself of the e l ec t r i ca l 
work along with the labor and m a t e r i a l s is indicative of the fact that Wasatch 
was not subject to the genera l superv i sory control of the genera l con t rac tor . 
It is apparent that respondent , in fact, was an independent cont rac tor 
as defined in Section 31-1-42, Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
"Any pe r son , f i rm or corporat ion engaged in the per formance of 
work as an independent contractor shal l be deemed an employer 
within the meaning of this section. The t e r m 'independent con-
t r ac to r 1 as here in used, is defined to be any person , associa t ion , 
or corporat ion engaged is independent of the employer in al l that 
pe r ta ins to the execution of the work, not subject to the rule or 
control of the employer , engaged only in the per formance of a 
definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer 
only in affecting a r e su l t in accordance with the employer ' s design. " 
(Underscore added) 
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Clear ly , respondent , as an independent con t rac tor , was a person 
"not in the same employment" with r e s p e c t to the decedent. Accordingly, 
the action for damages brought by d e c e d e n t s he i r s is p roper ly founded on 
Section 35-6-62 , Utah Code Annotated, and should not have been d i s m i s s e d 
by the t r i a l court . 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPOND-
ENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS THERE 
REMAINED A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE OF FACT IN DISPUTE 
It i s a wel l es tab l i shed tenet of Amer i can ju r i sprudence that a t r i a l 
cour t may not grant s u m m a r y judgment unless it is apparent that the re exist 
no significant i s sue s of fact in dispute . This law has been followed by this 
Court . 
f ,The final observat ion is that a s u m m a r y judgment which 
depr ives a pa r ty of an opportunity to p re sen t his evidence 
should be granted only when it c lea r ly appears that there is 
no i s sue of fact in dispute which if reso lved in favor of the 
l o s e r s would entitle them to preva i l . " Wingets , Inc. v. 
B i t t e r s , 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P. 2d 1007 (1972) at p. 236. 
f , Pr io r dec is ions point out that s u m m a r y judgment is a 
d r a s t i c r emedy and should be granted with re luc tance . 
The plaintiffs should be granted the opportunity of p r o -
ducing whatever evidence they wish, including c i r c u m -
s tan t ia l evidence, in support of their contention. . . M 
Housley v. Anaconda Co. , 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P. 2d 390 
(1967) at p. 127. 
As d i scussed in Point I above, Appellant u rges that the decedent was 
c l ea r ly not "in the same employment" as respondent as that t e r m is used 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-9 -
in Section 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and as explained by the 
Court in Pe te r son v. Fowler , supra . 
The i s sues of whether or not a workman is an employee of a given 
cont rac tor , or whether that contractor is a subcontractor or independent 
contractor a re frequently difficult. Such i s sues a r e frequently of such 
complexity that reasonable and fair minded men can and do d i sagree . As 
such, these i s sues do not lend themselves to s u m m a r y judgment. As Chief 
Jus t ice Crockett s tated in his concurr ing opinion in Gallegos v. Str ingham, 
21 Utah 2d 139, 442 P. 2d 31 (1968) at p. 34, 
"However, I think it appropr ia te to cal l attention to the fact that 
the question of employer-employee re la t ionship as compared to 
independent contrac tor is somet imes fraught with considerable 
difficulty and may involve considerat ion of a number of facts in 
addition to the apparent r ight of control . " 
Appellant respectful ly submits that in light of the s ta tutory and case 
law d iscussed in Point I above, it is c lear that the decedent and respondent 
were not engaged in the same employment, or that at leas t there exis ts a 
r e a l and significant i s sue of fact which prevents a proper render ing of 
summary judgment. 
POINT III 
SECTION 35-1-63, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, AS AMENDED 
1975, SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY AND IS 
CONTROLLING OF THE INSTANT CASE 
The prevai l ing rule of law is that a statute which is r emed ia l in na ture 
or affects only legal procedure without destroying vested r ights is to be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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applied re t rospec t ive ly . This fundamental pr inciple of jur i sprudence has 
been followed consistently in Utah. In Petty v. Clark , 113 Utah 205, 192 
P. 2d 589 (1948) this Court held, inter a l ia , "that where a statute r e m e d i a l 
in nature is amended providing a different r emedy , al l act ions pending wil l 
be governed by the new statutory provision. " Id. at p. 593. In accord is 
Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 p* 117(1909). 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico has a r t icu la ted the same ru le : 
"It is wel l set t led that the leg is la ture may pass a statute which 
shal l be re t roac t ive in cha rac t e r , and open to no consti tutional 
objection upon that account when it affects the remedy only and 
does not d i s tu rb vested r ights or obligations of a contract . " 
Yates v. Hawkins, 46 N. M. 249, 126 P . 2d 476 (1942) at p. 480. 
The Courts of California have a lso held the same: 
"The pr inciple which forbids application of new enactments or 
rev is ions re t roac t ive ly applies only to s ta tutes dealing with 
vested or substantive r igh t s . It is a lso wel l es tabl ished that 
s ta tutes effecting changes in civil p rocedure or r emedy may have 
valid re t rospec t ive application. 
"In the construct ion of r emed ia l s ta tu tes , such as the one now 
before us , r e g a r d mus t always be had for the evident purpose 
for which that statute was enacted, and if the r eason of the 
statute extends to pas t t r ansac t ions , as well as to those in the 
future, then it wil l be so applied, although the statute does not, 
in t e r m s , so d i rec t . . . " Abrams v. Stone, 154 Cal. App. 2d 33, 
315 P. 2d 453 (1957) at p. 458-459. 
Senate Bill No. 26, passed by the Utah State Legis la ture in the 1975 
genera l sess ion makes an impor tant clarifying amendment to Section 35-1-62, 
Utah Code Annotated. The curc ia l pa r t of this amendment s ta tes the follow-
ing: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-11-
!ijr0r the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the p rov i -
sions of Section 35-1-42, the injured employee or his he i r s or 
pe rsona l represen ta t ive may also maintain an action for damages 
against sub -con t r ac to r s , genera l con t r ac to r s , or a s s igns , not 
occupying an employee-employer re la t ionship with the injured or 
deceased employee at the t ime of his injury or death. " (Under-
score added) 
It i s c l e a r that the provisions of this amendment a r e controlling of 
the case at bar . Appellants , as he i r s of a deceased workman, seek to ma in -
tain an action for damages against an independent or subcontractor with whom 
the deceased c lear ly had no employer-employee re la t ionship . 
It is equally c lear that Senate Bill No. 26 does not des t roy any vested 
r ights or obligations. Its purpose and effect is r emed ia l in that it provides 
a cer ta in remedy for workmen injured by negligent subcont rac to rs , indepen-
dent cont rac tors and o thers . The case law d iscussed above from Utah and 
surrounding s ta tes is unequivocal in its holding that such r emed ia l s tatutes 
may be applied re t rospec t ive ly to actions pending at the t ime of the s ta tu te ' s 
passage . 
In summation, it was e r r o r for the t r i a l court to not hold this 
amended statute controlling of the instant case and Appellants respectfully 
urge this Court to c o r r e c t said e r r o r . 
POINT IV 
DENIAL OF APPELLANTS' CAUSE OF ACTION IS A 
VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS' 14th AMENDMENT 
GUARANTEE OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
In this case , the Appellants have been held to have no cause of action 
against a subcontractor because the deceased was an employee of the genera l 
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cont rac tor ; notwithstanding the fact that Shupe's work was unre la ted to that 
of Respondent and was remote in place . However, if decedent had been 
employed by an independent cont rac tor , and his he i r s sought to maintain this 
action against another independent contrac tor whose work was r emote and 
unrela ted , the action could no doubt be maintained under Section 35-1-62 
Utah Code Annotated. The r e su l t is that a classif icat ion has been drawn which 
would allow Appellants to maintain an action against Respondent if the label 
independent contractor were at tached to both, but not if the label gene ra l and 
subcontractor a r e used, r e g a r d l e s s of the fact that in both cases the pa r t i e s 
a r e performing t asks which a r e unrela ted and remote in p lace . 
The United States Supreme Court has held in many cases that the 
drawing of any such dist inction or classif icat ion which t r e a t s people differently 
r e q u i r e s a ra t iona l bas i s . Railway E x p r e s s Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 
106, 69 S. Ct. 463, 93 L. Ed. 553 (1949). This dist inction which a r o s e out 
of the p r e - amended Section 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated and was p r o m u l -
gated by the t r i a l court has no ra t iona l ba s i s . Appellants respectful ly submit 
that there can be no ra t iona l underpinning for disallowing acces s to s ta te 
cour ts in one situation while denying it in an ident ical si tuation on the bas is 
of a r b i t r a r y definitions and labe ls . 
The United States Supreme Court has a l so held that where a fundamental 
r ight is involved, c lass i f icat ions wil l rece ive a g r ea t e r degree of scru t iny . 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 86 L. Ed 1655 (1942). 
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In the case at hand, Appellants have been denied a fundamental r ight , namely 
acces s to state court . - . , .. r 
It should a lso be noted that the Utah State Legis la ture has become aware 
of the unequal and unjudicious classif icat ions c rea ted by Section 35-1-62, Utah 
Code Annotated. The amendment thereto is c lear ly designed to cure this 
unconstitutional defect by making it manifestly c lear that a workman or his 
he i r s may maintain an action against any subcont rac tor , genera l contractor 
or independent contractor who is not that workman ' s immedia te employer . 
Appellants urge that this Court end the ambiguous and unequal appl ica-
tion of this statute by allowing it to embody the meaning the leg is la ture intended 
it to have as manifested by the 1975 amendment there to . 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, Appellants s trongly urge that the Dis t r ic t Court e r r e d in 
entering summary judgment for four r e a s o n s , to-wit: (1) the pa r t i e s were 
not engaged in the same employment; (2) the 1975 amendment to Section 
35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated, may proper ly be applied re t rospec t ive ly ; 
(3) summary judgment was improper ly rendered , and (4) Respondent was 
actually an independent contractor within the meaning of Section 31-1-42, Utah 
Code Annotated. Appellants further a s s e r t that the statute as applied was a 
violation of their 14th Amendment r igh ts . 
As stated by this Court in Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Indus t r ia l 
Commiss ion , 2 Utah 2d 1, 268 P . 2d 689 (1953) at p. 693: 
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"This Court has consistently adhered to the rule that the 
Workmen ' s Compensation ac ts should be l iberal ly con-
s t rued in favor of the employee or his dependents . . . ,! 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. Clayton Fa i rbourn 
Henriksen, Fa i rbourn and Tate 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellants 
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